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Abstract The common interpretation given to choice behavior that satisfies the traditional revealed
preference axioms is that it results from the maximization of a single preference. We show that choice
data alone does not enable one to rule out the possibility that the choice behavior that satisfies the
revealed preference axioms is instead the result of the aggregation of a collection of distinct preferences.
In particular, we show that any ordering is observationally equivalent to a majoritarian aggregation of a
collection of distinct dichotomous orderings. We also show that any ordering is observationally equivalent
to a Borda’s aggregation of a collection of distinct linear orderings.
Keywords: Revealed preference theory; Rationalization; Dichotomous preferences; Aggregation rules;
Choice data.
JEL classification: B4; D01; D71.
1 Introduction
Initiated by Samuelson (1938) and developed by Houthakker (1950), Arrow (1959), Richter (1966), Afriat
(1967), Sen (1971) among many others, the revealed preference theory has established an equivalence
between observable properties of choice behavior - the traditional revealed preference axioms - and the
possibility for this behavior to be rationalized by a single preference1. A very common interpretation of
this equivalence is that any choice behavior that satisfies the revealed preference axioms results from the
maximization of a single preference. We show that this interpretation may be misleading. Specifically,
we show that it is impossible to distinguish - using choice data - if the behavior of an agent (be it an
individual or an institution) that satisfies the traditional revealed preference axioms is the result of a
(direct) maximization of a single preference or the result of the aggregation of a collection of distinct
preferences.
We show this for two widely known and used aggregation rules. First, we show that any ordering is
(observationally) equivalent to an aggregation of a collection of distinct dichotomous orderings by the
majority rule. Second, we show that any ordering is an aggregation of a collection of distinct linear
orderings by the Borda’s rule. From a technical perspective, the original content of these results can be
seen as generalizations of the McGarvey’s (1953) theorem. McGarvey (1953) shows that it is possible to
view any complete binary relation as the aggregation of a collection of linear orderings by the majority
rule. Here, we show that if one imposes transitivity to the binary relation, then a similar result holds for
(i) a collection of dichotomous orderings and for (ii) the Borda’s rule.
We believe that these results question in an interesting fashion the usual interpretation of the revealed
preferences axioms as unequivocal implications of the mono-rationality of choice behavior. For instance,
suppose that one observes the choice behavior of an household that satisfies the revealed preference
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1Examples of these axioms include the Weak and Strong Axioms of Revealed Preference and the Weak and Strong
Congruence Axioms. As shown by Sen (1971), these axioms are all equivalent when applied to a choice function defined
over all subsets of a finite set.
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axioms. Our results imply that one may need additional evidence in order to disentangle if this behavior
is coming from the decision of a “benevolent dictator” (one parent) or if it is instead the result of a
collective decision (an aggregation of the preferences of the family members). Alternatively, suppose that
one observes the choices of an individual decision maker. Our results indicate that if his or her choices
satisfy the revealed preference axioms, then there exists a sensible internal process by which a collection
of individual “selves” are aggregated into a single ordinal index. Then, it may be the case that the
individual is not revealing the maximization of a “better off” relation but instead the aggregation of
several preferences for which the ranking of alternatives may be different from one preference to the
other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to notation and preliminaries.
In Section 3 we present our results. In Section 4 we discuss the implications of these results. We summarize
our contribution in Section 5.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Let X be a finite set of alternatives denoted by x, y, etc., and assume that #X = n ≥ 3. Let A be any
subset of X and P(X) denote the set of all non-empty subsets of X. A choice function is a mapping
C : P(X) → X that satisfies C(A) ∈ A for every A ∈ P(X). The standard interpretation is that C(A)
is the chosen element from the set A. A binary relation R on X is a subset of X × X. Following the
convention in economics, we write xRy instead of (x, y) ∈ R. A binary relation R on X is (i) reflexive
if xRx for all x ∈ X, is (ii) complete if either xRy or yRx for all distinct x, y ∈ X, is (iii) transitive if
xRy and yRz imply xRz for any x, y, z ∈ X, and is (iv) antisymmetric if xRy and yRx imply that x = y
for any x, y ∈ X. Denote by P and I the asymmetric and symmetric components of R respectively, i.e.,
xPy ⇔ xRy ∧ ¬(yRx) and xIy ⇔ xRy ∧ yRx. Let I1, ..., Im(R) denote the m(R) indifference classes of
R from top to bottom such that for 1 ≤ j < l ≤ m(R) if x, y ∈ Ij then xIy and if x ∈ Ij and y ∈ I l
then xPy. An ordering on X is a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation on X, and a linear
ordering on X is an antisymmetric ordering on X. An ordering R is dichotomous if m(R) ≤ 2.
For any ordering R, a choice function C is said to be rationalized by R if C(A) = max
A
R := {x ∈ A :
∀y ∈ A xRy} for all A ∈ P(X). One of the traditional revealed preference axioms, the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (WARP), states that if an alternative x is “revealed preferred” to y (i.e., x is once
chosen when y is available and rejected), then y is not revealed to be “at least as good as” x (i.e., y is
never chosen when x is available). Formally, WARP states that for all x, y ∈ X and A,B ∈ P(X) if x ∈
C(A) and y ∈ A \ {C(A)} then ¬(y ∈ C(B) and x ∈ B). A choice function that satisfies this condition
can be viewed as resulting from the maximization of a single preference, i.e.:
Theorem 1 (Arrow, 1959) A choice function C satisfies WARP if and only if it is rationalized by an
ordering R.
For any collection (R1, ..., Rk) of k orderings on X, we define the majoritarian and Borda’s aggregation
rules, denoted respectively by Rmaj(R1, ..., Rk) and R
Bor(R1, ..., Rk), by:
x Rmaj(R1, ..., Rk) y ⇐⇒ #{i ≤ k : x Ri y} ≥ #{i ≤ k : y Ri x}
x Rbor(R1, ..., Rk) y ⇐⇒
k∑
i=1
#{z ∈ X : x Pi z} ≥
k∑
i=1
#{z ∈ X : y Pi z}
The Borda’s aggregation rule applied to a collection of orderings always generates an ordering. The
majoritarian aggregation rule generates a binary relation that is reflexive and complete but not neces-
sarily transitive. However, the majority relation always generates a transitive binary relation whenever
it aggregates a collection of dichotomous orderings, i.e.:
Theorem 2 (Inada 1964) Let (R1, ..., Rk) be a collection of k dichotomous orderings on X. Then the
majoritarian aggregation Rmaj(R1, ..., Rk) is an ordering on X.
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3 Results
We first establish that any ordering is equivalent to the majoritarian aggregation of a collection of distinct
dichotomous orderings2:
Theorem 3 R is an ordering on X if and only if there exists a collection (R1, ..., Rk) of k distinct
dichotomous orderings on X such that Rmaj(R1, ..., Rk) = R.
Proof Given Theorem 2, only the second implication needs to be established. We distinguish three cases:
(i) m(R) > 2, (ii) m(R) = 2, and (iii) m(R) = 1. For the first case, take a dichotomous ordering R1 such
that the top indifference class is I1 and the bottom indifference class is ∪2≤j≤m(R)Ij . Then, take a second
dichotomous ordering R2 such that the top indifference class is I
1∪I2 and the bottom indifference class is
∪3≤j≤m(R)Ij . Proceeding this way, we arrive at a collection (R1, ..., Rm(R)−1) dichotomous orderings such
that all x ∈ I1 are in the top indifference class of m(R)−1 dichotomous orderings, all x ∈ I2 are in the top
indifference class of m(R)−2 dichotomous orderings, and so on. Then, straightforward verification shows
that the binary relation induced by the majoritarian aggregation of (R1, ..., Rm(R)−1) is the ordering R.
For the second case, the previous construction generates a single dichotomous orderings R1. Then, add
to this dichotomous ordering a universally equivalent (dichotomous) ordering and denote it R2. It follows
that the binary relation induced by the majoritarian aggregation of (R1, R2) is the ordering R. For the
third case, consider all pairs (x, y) of R. Then, for each of these pairs take two dichotomous orderings
R1 and R2 such that xP1yI1a1I1a2I1...I1an−2 and yP2xI2a1I2a2I2...I2an−2 where a1, ..., an−2 are the
remaining alternatives of X. Proceeding this way, we arrive at a collection (R1, ..., Rk) of k = n(n − 1)
dichotomous orderings such that these express opposing preferences and cancel each other with respect
to any given pair of alternatives. Then, the binary relation induced by the majoritarian aggregation of
(R1, ..., Rk) is the ordering R.
uunionsq
The original content of Theorem 3 can be viewed as a generalization of McGarvey’s (1953) theorem3.
McGarvey (1953) shows that it is possible to view any complete binary relation R as the majoritarian
aggregation of a collection of n(n − 1) linear orderings. Here, we show that by requiring the binary
relation R to be transitive a similar result holds for a collection of dichotomous orderings4. Dichotomous
orderings benefit from a very palatable interpretation, and is the only domain restriction defined with
respect to each individual binary relation that is sufficient for the majoritarian aggregation rule to be
always transitive when the number of binary relations is not necessarily odd5. This is relevant in terms
of the implications of Theorem 3 that we discuss below.
It is worth noting that contrary to any ordering, it is not possible to view any complete binary relation
as the majoritarian aggregation of a collection of dichotomous preferences. For instance, suppose that
X = {x, y, z} and that xPy, yPz, and zPx. It is easy to check that there is no collection of dichotomous
orderings such that a majoritarian aggregation induces this complete binary relation. The interested
reader may also notice that the number of binary relations constructed in Theorem 3 is considerably
lower than that in McGarvey (1953)6. This points to the fact that the required number of non-linear
orderings necessary for an ordering to be represented by the majority rule may be in general lower
than the required number of linear orderings needed for an ordering (or a complete binary relation)
to be represented by the same method. Now, we establish a similar result with respect to the Borda’s
aggregation rule:
Theorem 4 R is an ordering on X if and only if there exists a collection (R1, ..., Rk) of k distinct linear
orderings on X such that Rbor(R1, ..., Rk) = R.
2We require the collection of orderings to be distinct since otherwise any ordering is equivalent to any aggregation of
the same single ordering or of a collection of identical ones to it.
3See e.g. Hollard and Breton (1996) and Gibson and Powers (2012) for other extensions of McGarvey (1953).
4Note that this result is not a corollary of McGarvey (1953). Although the McGarvey’s (1953) theorem implies that any
ordering can be viewed as a majoritarian aggregation of a collection of linear orderings, it does not entail that any ordering
can be viewed as a majoritarian aggregation of a collection of dichotomous orderings.
5See Inada (1969) and Sen and Pattanaik (1969) for the remaining domain restrictions that are sufficient (and necessary)
for the majoritarian aggregation rule to be always transitive when the number of binary relations is not necessarily odd.
Contrary to dichotomous orderings, these restrictions are defined with respect to the admissible profile of binary relations.
6This is strictly true except when m(R) = 1, since in that case the number of binary relations constructed is the same.
See e.g. Stearns (1959), Deb (1976), and Brams and Fishburn (2002) for results and discussions concerning the minimal
number of binary relations necessary to express any complete binary relation over a set made of n alternatives.
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Proof To prove the non-trivial implication, we distinguish two cases: (i) m(R) < n and (ii) m(R) = n.
For the first case (non-linear ordering), take two linear orderings R1 and R2 such that (1) for all x ∈ Ij
and all y ∈ I l with 1 ≤ j < l ≤ m(R) one has xP1y and xP2y, and (2) for all xp ∈ Ij with p = 1, .., q
one has x1P1x2P1...P1xq and xqP2xq−1P2...P2x1. Since m(R) < n, (2) guarantees that the two linear
orderings are distinct. Then, straightforward verification shows that the binary relation induced by the
Borda’s aggregation of (R1, R2) is the ordering R. For the second case (linear ordering), consider all pairs
(x, y) of R. Then, for each of these pairs such that xPy take two linear orderings P1 and P2 such that
xP1yP1a1P1a2P1...P1an−2 and an−2P2an−3P2...P2a1P2xP2y; For each of these pairs such that xIy take
two linear orderings P1 and P2 such that xP1yP1a1P1a2P1...P1an−2 and an−2P2an−3P2...P2a1P2yP2x
where a1, ..., an−2 are the remaining alternatives of X. Proceeding this way, we arrive at a collection
(R1, ..., Rk) of k = n(n − 1) linear orderings such that two of these express R’s strict preference or
indifference between any given pair of alternatives while all other linear orderings cancel with respect to
this pair. Then, the binary relation induced by the Borda’s aggregation of (R1, ..., Rk) is the ordering R.
uunionsq
This result shows that an ordering is formally equivalent to the Borda’s aggregation of a collection of
distinct preferences. The interested reader may notice that whenever the binary relation is not a linear
ordering, then one needs only two preferences to induce it by the Borda’s rule. In a recent paper, Kelly
and Qi (2016) show that for a fixed k ≥ 2 any ordering is in the range of the Borda’s rule except when
k is odd and n is even. This subsumes our result with the exception of the case in which R is a linear
ordering (and since we look at a collection of distinct preferences). So we do not wish to overemphasize
the novelty of our contribution on this front and prefer instead to concentrate on the implications that
this result entails.
In particular, these theorems show the equivalence between a single preference and two aggregations of
a collection of distinct preferences: it is possible to generate any single preference from these aggregations
and these aggregations always generate a single preference. Then, it follows that the maximization of
a single preference is not observationally distinguishable from these aggregations. This implication is
captured in the following corollaries to our theorems and Arrow (1959):
Corollary of Theorems 1 and 3 A choice function C satisfies WARP if and only if it is rationalized
by the majoritarian aggregation Rmaj(R1, ..., Rk) of a collection (R1, ..., Rk) of k distinct dichotomous
orderings.
Corollary of Theorems 1 and 4 A choice function C satisfies WARP if and only if it is rationalized
by the Borda’s aggregation RBor(R1, ..., Rk) of a collection (R1, ..., Rk) of k distinct linear orderings.
4 Discussion
Whenever a choice function satisfies WARP (or any equivalent axiom), our results show that the choice
behavior can not only be rationalized by the direct maximization of a single preference but also by
two sensible aggregations of a larger collection of preferences. The novelty of this claim is not that other
interpretations are possible, since this is inherent to rationalization results that only tell us that observable
behavior can be emerging as if the agent is performing a specific decision process. But as Sen (1973),
among many others, has forcefully argued, revealed preference theory is only meaningful if it is anchored
to the revelation of a sensible decision making process. Interpreted in this light, the novelty is to show
that the most common interpretation given to the rationalization of behavior that satisfies the traditional
revealed preference axioms is formally equivalent to other sensible interpretations.
This relates our results to the analysis that use the revealed preference methodology to characterize
collective or nonstandard decision models. There is by now an established literature on the rationalization
of decision models with multiple preferences (e.g. Manzini and Mariotti 2007; Masatlioglu et al. 2012).
These contributions can be seen as a first step to find an axiomatic counterpart to the psychological and
empirical literature on multiple identities/selves (e.g. Turner 1985; Hoff and Pandey 2006; LeBoeuf et al.
2010; Benjamin et al. 2010). In this respect, our results point towards sensible rationalizations of the
standard rational choice behavior by two decision models with multiple preferences.
Our results also relate with the emerging field of empirical revealed preference theory. Following Afriat
(1967) and Varian (1982a, 1982b), empirical revealed preference theory has become more feasible and
applicable to different fields of economics7. One of its major applications has been to the domain of
7Authors in this field have focused on consumption data, albeit many economic decisions are discrete in nature. A choice
function is relevant as it can be regarded as a generic tool to analyze any type of choice (see Sen 1973).
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household economics (e.g. Browning and Chiappori 1998; Cherchye et al. 2010). This is a good example,
as noted in the introduction, to illustrate the implications of our results in terms of the (im)possibility to
distinguish between individual and collective decisions. Our results indicate that when it comes to discrete
decisions, it may be the case that the observable properties of the choice behavior of an household are not
sufficient to ascertain if the household is a unitary decision entity or if it is instead following a collective
decision model. Equivalent implications hold for the choice behavior of committees, teams, or any other
organization as long as the decision process is unknown to the observer.
Finally, our results may shed some light to the conceptual and methodological apparatus that is often
used in economics. In a recent contribution to a book on the Foundations of Positive and Normative
Economics, Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) have endorsed a view of “mindless economics” with the following
premises:
“In the standard approach, the terms “utility maximization” and “choice” are synonymous. A
utility function is always an ordinal index that describes how the individual ranks various outcomes
and how he behaves (chooses) given his constraints (available options). The relevant data are
revealed preference data, that is, consumption choices given the individuals constraints.” (Gul and
Pesendorfer 2008, 7)
We can make two comments in the light of our analysis. First, our results indicate that “utility
maximization” and “choice” are not necessarily synonymous. Using Samuelson’s own lexicon (in Archibald
et al. 1963), satisfying WARP may be perfectly “realistic” at the same time that “maximizing ordinal
utility” is not. This is so, since, as argued before, it is not possible to exclude that the behavior that
satisfies WARP results instead from one of two aggregations of a collection of distinct preferences8. Second,
our results illustrate one of the difficulties of relying exclusively on “revealed preference data”. Specifically,
they indicate that different models are not necessarily distinguishable using choice data alone. This brings
an additional argument in favor of two stances: 1) that the revealed preference principle cannot be always
used as a criterion for selecting between two modeling approaches (see e.g. Spiegler 2008), and 2) that we
may need to combine choice observations with other types of data in order to understand the underlying
reasons of behavior (see e.g. Schotter 2008). If our results only provide a mild argument in favor of these
views, they highlight the internal tension that may emerge from mindless economics.
5 Conclusion
The message of this note can be summarized in one sentence: a single rationalization may hide multiple
rationalizations. In effect, when one observes a choice function that can be rationalized by a single
ordering, one can not exclude that this rationalization results in fact from a (majoritarian or Borda)
aggregation of a larger collection of individual orderings/linear orderings. Then, given the theoretical
prominence to favor choice data in economics (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer 2008; Binmore 2009) and the
increasingly application of empirical revealed preference theory in fields such as household economics,
these remarks highlight the relevance of circumspection on the interpretation of this type of data: won’t
it be the tree that hides the forest.
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